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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
social welfare it does have expertise in the field of social policy. That
is, the criteria for determining the time of death should not be a factual
issue to be decided by the jury in each case but, instead, should be a
socially accepted statement of the law, duly responding to medical ad-
vancements but not completely controlled by a purported consensus of
medical science.58
Second, by recognizing brain death as a possible means for deter-
mining the time of death, the Tucker case, like the Kansas statute,
acknowledges medical realities. Since the appearance of the Harvard
Report,5' which stated the "brain death" criteria in 1968, there has been
general acceptance by the medical profession that one is dead when his
brain is not functioning and his respiration is not spontaneous." Again,
the medical need for transplant organs and the social need for protecting
potential donors from premature transplantation are not issues to be
resolved by exclusive reliance upon the medical profession.
While the medical profession would doubtless approve of the ver-
dict reached in Tucker, the death criteria and the clinical tests applied
to indicate the satisfaction of these criteria are questions too socially
important to be considered factual issues to be decided by a jury. Since
there is no legal precedent for the courts to follow in establishing death
criteria to be employed in the transplant context, the various legislatures
of the states should recognize the dilemma with which the courts and
physicians are faced and should return to the pronouncement of death
the much needed characteristic of finality.
RICHMOND STANFIELD FREDERICK II
Separation of Powers-The Suspended Sentence
Every day more than one hundred and fifty Americans are killed
in automobile accidents.' Over half of these fatalities involve alcohol-
uThere are other problems with which law-makers will have to grapple in this complex area
of transplantation. Who is to decide how the limited number of available organs is to be distributed
for transplantation? Are physicians to be given absolute freedom to determine who is to live and
who is to die? When human resources are to be allocated, who is to exercise the ultimate control?
Unfortunately, discussion of these issues is beyond the limitations of this note.
5 Harvard Medical School Ad Hoc Committee to Examine the Definition of Brain Death,
supra note I.
"See authorities cited note 48, supra.
'McDowell, How Phoenix Gets Drunks Off the Road, READER'S DIGEST, Feb. 1972, at 52.
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related accidents.2 Outraged by this senseless carnage, various state
legislaturesl and governmental agencies have commenced an all-out
campaign against driving under the influence of alcohol. In Wisconsin,
the arresting officer uses a mobile videotape camera to record the vehi-
cle's abnormal operation and the driver's behavior.' Vermont has a
tough program of interrogation and coordination tests given to special
enforcement officers while measured amounts of alcohol gradually
bring their blood alcohol level up to the state's intoxication standard.4
In Nassau County, New York, a twenty-four hour telephone service is
maintained so drunks can call for transportation.' The Idaho state legis-
lature has cracked down by setting a mandatory ten-day sentence on all
drivers convicted of driving under the influence.' The statute provided
that the sentence shall be imposed by every judge in Idaho without any
right to exercise judicial discretion.
Found guilty of driving under the influence by an Idaho probate
court, Ernesto Medina was fined one hundred and seventy-five dollars
and sentenced to thirty days in the county jail.7 The judge then sus-
pended the entire jail sentence and most of the fine, placing Medina on
probation for six months. The prosecutor promptly filed a writ of man-
date to compel the judge either to sentence the defendant according to
the mandatory ten-day provision or to show cause why. The district
court quashed the writ, and on appeal the Idaho Supreme Court held
that the mandatory provision of the statute was an unconstitutional
breach of the separation of powers and an invalid limitation upon the
Another 9,560 are injured daily. Id. These figures are, of course, averages.
21d. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration estimates that a driver with 0.10%
blood-alcohol concentration is almost seven times more likely to have a vehicle collision than his
non-drinking counterpart. Once the blood-alcohol concentration reaches 0.15% the driver is 25
times more likely to have a collision than a non-drinker. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, THE ALCOHOL SAFETY COUNTERMEASURES
PROGRAM 3-4 (rev. ed. 1971).
3TimE, Apr. 3, 1972, at 59. As of April 1972, every driver videotaped and charged has pleaded
guilty to operating while intoxicated. Most of these drivers have been placed on a corrective
probationary program. Id.
'TIME, Mar. 6, 1972, at 55.
5McDowell, supra note 1, at 54.
'IDAHO CODE § 49-1102(d) (Supp. 1971): "Every person convicted under this section shall
serve at least ten (10) days in the county or municipal jail and this sentence shall be mandatory on
every judge of every court of the state of Idaho without any right to exercise judicial discretion in
said matter .. "
7State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, -, 486 P.2d 247, 248 (1971).
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court's inherent right to suspend sentences.8 The court rested its decision
upon the common law power to suspend sentences, the tripartite separa-
tion of powers of the Idaho constitution, the inherent powers of the
judiciary, and a common-sense interpretation of the role of the judge in
our system of law?
At common law the severity of sentences, the inability to decree
new trials, and the lack of an effective appellate review of the facts gave
rise to the court's power to suspend sentence, at least temporarily, even
in the absence of an enabling statute.'0 In Sir Matthew Hale's Pleas of
the Crown, a scholarly work on the criminal law by the chief justice of
the Court of the King's Bench in the seventeenth century, the author
noted three kinds of suspension:
Reprieves or stays of judgment or execution are of three kinds.
viz.
I. Ex mandato regis [from the King's order], .. by some mes-
sage, or by sending his ring, but at this day it is ordinarily signified by
the privy signet, or by the master of requests.
II. Ex arbitrio judicis [from the authority of the judge]. Some-
times the judge reprieves before judgment, as where he is not satisfied
with the verdict, or the evidence is uncertain, or the indictment insuffi-
cient, or doubtful whether within clergy; and sometimes after judg-
ment, if it be a small felony, tho out of clergy, or in order to a pardon
or transportation ...
III. Ex necessitate legis [from the law of necessity], which is in
case of pregnancy, where a woman is convict of felony or treason."
However, a later commentator, the famous Sir William Black-
stone, stressed the temporary nature of suspension:
I. A reprieve, from reprendre, to take back, is the withdrawing
of a sentence for an interval of time: whereby the execution is sus-
pended. This may be, first, ex arbitrio judicis; either before or after
judgment: as, where the judge is not satisfied with the verdict, or the
81d. at _ 486 P.2d at 252. The power to suspend sentences refers to two distinct procedures:
suspension by refusing to impose and pronounce sentence once guilt has attached or the suspension
of the execution of a sentence already pronounced. The Idaho court was dealing with the latter
interpretation of suspended sentence. Unless otherwise indicated, this note is concerned with sus-
pension of the execution of sentence.
'Id. at ._ 486 P.2d at 249-52.
"People ex rel. Forsyth v. Court of Sessions, 141 N.Y. 288, 292-93, 36 N.E. 386, 387 (1894).
See also 30 HARV. L. REv. 369 (1917).
"12 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 412-13 (S. Emlyn ed. 1778).
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evidence is suspicious, or the indictment is insufficient, or he is doubt-
ful whether the offence be within clergy; or sometimes if it be a small
felony, or any favorable circumstances appear in the criminal's charac-
ter, in order to give room to apply to the crown for either an absolute
or conditional pardon.
2
Relying mainly on Blackstone's qualification of the temporary na-
ture of suspended sentences, in 1916 the United States Supreme Court
held in Ex parte United States3 that the federal district courts did not
have the power to suspend sentences. The majority of state courts now
hold that in the absence of statute a court may withhold temporarily the
imposition of sentence for a term, but the court is powerless to suspend
permanently the operation of a sentence already imposed. 4 The courts
of a handful of states, including New York," New Jersey, 6 North Caro-
14 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *394. Blackstone also recognized the pregnancy, insanity,
and non-identity pleas for temporary suspension or stay of execution as well as the permanent
King's pardon. Id. at *396.
'242 U.S. 27 (1916). In 1925 Congress passed a federal probation act the present version of
which provides in part as follows:
Upon entering a judgment of conviction of any offense not punishable by death or
life imprisonment, any court having jurisdiction to try offenses against the United States
when satisfied that the ends of justice and the best interest of the public as well as the
defendant will be served thereby, may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence
and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and condi-
tions as the court deems best.
18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1970).
"ALI-ABA JOINT COmm. ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., THE PROBLEM OF SENTENCING 40
(1962). See also J. WAITE, THE PREVENTION OF REPEATED CRIME 95 (1943).
"People ex rel. Forsyth v. Court of Sessions, 141 N.Y. 288, 292, 36 N.E. 386, 387 (1894):
"There can, I think, be no doubt that the power to suspend sentence after conviction was inherent
in all such courts at common law." Therefore, the New York Court of Appeals concluded that
the court of sessions, a court with superior criminal jurisdiction, had the power to suspend the
imposition of sentence. In People v.Oskroba, 305 N.Y. 113, 117, 111 N.E.2d 235, 236-37 (1953),
the court of appeals stated, "It has long been accepted practice in the administration of criminal
law that, after conviction, a court may suspend the sentence or execution of judgment and place
the defendant on probation, a power inherent in the court at common law ... "
However, some New York cases restrict this power to suspend as applying only to crimes set
out in the penal code, and in a case involving the sale of spirituous liquors, a violation of the Liquor
Tax Law and not the Penal Code, the New York Supreme Court held that a lower court judge
could not suspend the execution of a sentence where the specific statute required that one convicted
be imprisoned. People ex rel. Hirschberg v. Seeger, 179 App. Div. 792, 166 N.Y.S. 913 (1917).
'""Enough, however, can be gathered from the English precedents to show that courts of
criminal jurisdiction exercised the power of delaying the imposition of a sentence for variou
reasons, and of delaying the operation of an imposed sentence, and did not do this by virtue of
any statute, and therefore must have inherently had the power so to do." State ex rel. Gehrmann
v. Osborne, 79 N.J. Eq. 430, 441, 82 A. 424, 428 (Ch. 1911). The court held that, if the defendant
1972]
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lina, 7 Michigan,"5 Ohio 9 and now Idaho, 20 regard the power to suspend
as inherent in the judiciary, although only in the Idaho case was a court
faced with overruling a specific legislative mandate in the criminal stat-
ute itself prohibiting the suspension of sentence. Nevertheless, today
virtually all states empower their courts to suspend the execution or the
imposition of sentence in conjunction with a probation system.,
Conceding that the power might have existed at common law, the
state prosecutor in the Idaho case argued that the state legislature
clearly has the power to abrogate the common law.2 The state is not
inexorably bound by common law principles. The Idaho Supreme Court
readily agreed but pointed out that this power is not merely a substan-
tive element of the common law; rather, it goes to the very nature of
the judiciary branch of the state government.23
According to the Idaho state constitution, the judicial power is
vested in the courts;2 4 however, state constitutions have traditionally
been regarded as limitations upon power, not grants of power .2  Like
most state constitutions, the specific powers of the judiciary are not
does not object, it can suspend the imposition of sentence. Id. at 443, 82 A. at 429. Concerning
the power to suspend the execution of a sentence once pronounced, see Clifford v. Heller, 63 N.J.L.
105, 116, 42 A. 155, 159 (1899): "At common law reprieve might be granted either by the king
under his power to pardon or by the court, and every court which had power to award execution
had power to grant a reprieve. This reprieve was simply a suspension of the sentence."
"7State v. Simmington, 235 N.C. 612, 614, 70 S.E.2d 842, 844 (1952): "A court has the
inherent power to suspend a judgment or stay execution of a sentence in a criminal case."
"8 People v. Stickle, 156 Mich. 557, 564, 121 N.W. 497, 499 (1909): "Assuming the power to
be, as it was at common law asserted to be, a power inherent in courts, no new power is conferred
upon courts when the legislature in terms authorizes courts to suspend sentence."
"An early Ohio case recognized the inherent power of the court to suspend sentence, but
apparently in Ohio the.power could be abrogated by the state legislature. Weber v. State, 58 Ohio
St. 616, 619, 51 N.E. 116, 117 (1898): "The power to stay the execution of a sentence, in whole or
in part, in a criminal case, is inherent in every court having final jurisdiction in such cases, unless
otherwise provided by statute."
194 Idaho at _ 486 P.2d at 251: "In this light, we perceive that the authority possessed
by the courts to sentence necessarily includes the power to suspend the whole or any part of that
sentence in proper cases and this is more than a bare rule of substantive law subject to change by
the legislature. Rather, it is in the nature of an inherent right of the judicial department. .. "
2 Professor John Waite has listed statutory programs of probation and suspended sentence for
forty-five states, the District of Columbia, and the federal system. J. WAITE, supra note 14 at 96-
105.
294 Idaho at _ 486 P.2d at 249.
DId. at _ , 486 P.2d at 251.
211DAHO CONST. art. 5, § 2.
'See, e.g., Los Angeles Met. Transp. Auth. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 59 Cal. 2d 863, 868, 382
P.2d 583, 585, 31 Cal. Rptr. 463, 465 (1963); Mclntyre v. Clarkson, 254 N.C. 510, 515, 119 S.E,2d
888, 891 (1961); Shepherd v. San Jacinto Junior College Dist., 363 S.W.2d 742, 743 (Tex. 1962).
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enumerated in the Idaho Constitution; however, article V, section thir-
teen provides that the legislature has no power "to deprive the judicial
department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it as
a coordinate department of the government."2 Although the concept of
vested judicial power is difficult to define, many aspects of this inherent
power have been recognized by state and federal courts in the evolution
of case law. The contempt power,27 the power of the attorney general
to enter nolle prosequi on an indictment,2 and the power to run sent-
ences concurrently 2 have all been recognized as not requiring any ena-
bling legislation. These powers, as well as the power to suspend sent-
ences, are illustrative of the vested judicial power as interpreted by
different courts without being all-inclusive.
If courts do have the inherent power to suspend sentence, serious
questions concerning the separation of powers arise. States that deny the
power to suspend sentence in the absence of statute often reason that
this is judicial infringement upon the executive's power to pardon."
However, in practice the courts usually suspend sentence only for minor
offenses, reserving more serious crimes for the governor's pardon.',
Also, the trial judge who observed all the evidence, the witnesses' de-
meanor, and testimony regarding the defendant's character will be in a
better position to decide upon the appropriate punishment, imprison-
ment or probation. Arguably, the executive power to pardon affects the
2 IDAHO CONST. art. 5, § 13. For a very similar provision see N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
"In State v. Steelworkers Local 5760, 172 Ohio St. 75, 80, 173 N.E.2d 331, 336 (1961), the
Supreme Court of Ohio declared the general rule: "That a court inherently, and quite apart from
any statutory authority or express constitutional grant, possesses such contempt power has been
the rule from time immemorial."
2The inherent common law powers of the attorney general in regard to nolle prosequi are
extensively set out in People ex rel. Elliott v. Covelli, 415 Il1. 79, 83-89, 112 N.E.2d 156, 158-61
(1953). The general rule is that in the absence of statute, the power to enter a nolle prosequi is
vested in the attorney general or in the several public prosecutors. 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 457
(1961).
a"In the absence of statute, the determination whether two sentences to the same penal
institution shall run concurrently or consecutively is an incident to the judicial function of imposing
sentences upon a convict and is a matter for the determination of the court." Redway v. Walker,
132 Conn. 300, 306, 43 A.2d 748, 751 (1945). See also 24B C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1994 (1962).
3OSee, e.g., State v. Sturgis, 110 Me. 96, 101, 85 A. 474, 477 (1912); Rightnour v. Gladden,
219 Ore. 342, 355, 347 P.2d 103, 110 (1959). Apparently, the many states that require legislation
before the courts can suspend sentence reason that when two branches of government, the legisla-
ture and the judiciary, combine to infringe the executive's power to pardon the infringement is more
palatable.
112 N.C.L. REv. 50, 52 (1923).
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punishment and perhaps even the defendant's guilt.3" Under a sus-
pended sentence with the condition of defendant's good behavior, the
conviction and the civil disabilities remain;33 eventually, the defendant
may have to suffer the punishment.
Perhaps the greatest friction in the separation of powers arises
between the judicial and legislative branches. The particular role of the
legislative body in regard to the criminal law is to list and delineate the
offenses forbidden and to set the maximum and minimum penalties.34
Thus, these elected representatives seek to embody the will of the people
by setting penalties which expressly gauge the degree of society's disap-
proval of the proscribed conduct. 3 Certainly, the aims of the Idaho
legislature were meritorious in seeking to deter intoxicated drivers by
imposing a mandatory ten-day sentence.36 Accordingly, once the court
had discharged its duties by finding the facts and ascertaining the defen-
dant's guilt, the legislature sought to impose a sentence without the
interference of the trial judge's discretion. Unbridled judicial discretion
has long been criticized for its arbitrary nature, lack of adequate stan-
dards, and the glaring disparity of sentences within the maximum and
minimum range of penalties for virtually the same criminal acts. As one
legal writer explained:
Disparity without a rational basis not only offends principles ofjustice,
but may have an inhibiting effect on the treatment phase of criminal
administration as well. Prisoner morale bears a vital relationship to
prisoner response to the rehabilitative process and may be adversely
affected if the offender believes that his sentence is the product of the
230 HARV. L. REv. 369, 371 (1917).
9In discussing the lot of a petitioner who had been convicted of mail fraud and placed on
probation for two years, the United States Supreme Court noted:
Petitioner stands a convicted felon and unless the judgment against him is vacated
or reversed he is subject to all the disabilities flowing from such a judgment. The record
discloses that petitioner is a lawyer and by reason of his conviction his license was subject
to revocation (and petitioner says that he has been disbarred) without inquiry into his
guilt or innocence.
Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 213 (1937). See also People ex rel. Forsyth v. Court of
Sessions, 141 N.Y. 288, 294-95, 36 N.E. 386, 388 (1894).
'See, e.g., Exparte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42 (1916); Mack v. State, 203 Ind. 355, 368,
180 N.E. 279, 283 (1932); State v. Meyer, 228 Minn. 286, 37 N.W.2d 3 (1949); Woods v. State,
130 Tenn. 100, 169 S.W. 558 (1914).
'ALI-ABA JOINT COMM. ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., supra note 14, at 61.
'Furthermore, the statute provided that the ten-day sentence could be served over a six-week
period in one-day segments. IDAHO CODE § 49-1102(d) (Supp. 1971).
[Vol. 51
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prejudices or idiosyncrasies of a particular judge.7
However, the court noted that the specific wording of the statute in
effect deprived the court, an equal branch of government, of adequately
pperforming its function-the administration of justice."
Whenever a court invalidates a state statute, it must exercise great
caution in overruling the collective will of the legislature and upsetting
the system of law enforcement. 9 The power to interpret statutes and
to declare acts unconstitutional is in effect the ultimate veto power.
4
The very core of the separation of powers is that the legislature should
not have the power to determine the conclusiveness of its own deci-
sions. Clearly, a state needs independent courts as a check upon
usurped or arbitrary power. In trying to set the automatic sentence
without ever hearing the merits of the controversy, the legislature is not
acting impartially as a judge but is seeking a declared purpose. 42 Moreo-
ver, many leading authorities consider complete separation of powers
too impractical for the efficient day-to-day operation of government.43
The argument that the suspended sentence infringes upon the executive
pardon and the legislative right to affix maximum and minimum penal-
ties overlooks the necessary and desirable results of friction between the
different branches of government. As Justice Brandeis commented con-
cerning the separation of powers in the federal system,
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Conven-
tion of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of
arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means
of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmen-
tal powers among three departments, to save the people from autoc-
racy."
3Comment, Appellate Review of Primary Sentencing Decisions: A Connecticut Case Study,
69 YALE L.J. 1453, 1459 (1960). See also ALI-ABA JOINT COMM. ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC.,
supra note 14, at 64-77 for an engrossing discussion of the disparities of sentencing and the wide
divergence in penalties meted out by judges within the same state.
-194 Idaho at - 486 P.2d at 251-52.
21As dissenting Justice McFadden points out, all reasonable doubts are resolved in favor of
the act's constitutionality, and if the statute is subject to two interpretations, the one upholding its
validity should be adopted. Id. at _ , 486 P.2d at 252.
40Fairlie, The Separation of Powers, 21 MICH. L. REv. 393, 403 (1923).
"Pound, The Judicial Power, 35 HARV. L. REv. 787, 791 (1922).
"Cf. id. at 792.
4These are extensively noted in Fairlie, supra note 40, at 405-31.
"Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (dissenting opinion).
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Furthermore, the legislature necessarily rules by fiat in broad,
sweeping terms, while the courts are particularly suited for case-by-case
adjudication. In deciding that identical sentences are not constitution-
ally required for punishing two persons convicted of the same offense,
the United States Supreme Court acknowledged the role of judicial
discretion in our system: "Sentencing judges are vested with a wide
discretion in the exceedingly difficult task of determining the appropri-
ate punishment in the countless variety of situations that appear."45
Considering the large number of offenders he deals with, a judge famil-
iar with the aims of penology is a professional sentencer.40 Rather than
being the blind dispenser of justice, the judge is in a position to weigh
the interests of society and the merits of the particular offender. He
should be free to view each crime as unique and to weigh factors like
the defendant's prior history, the nature of the crime (whether physical
harm was involved), the likelihood of his committing other crimes,
whether he can compensate the state or victim, and the probable effect
of prison on this defendant. 7 Conversely, the judge is also well-suited
to deny suspended sentence when society's interest requires it or when
reformation and rehabilitation seem remote. Also, the judge must be
free to exercise discretion in the case with extenuating circumstances;
for example, the Idaho drunk-driving statute makes no exception for the
situation in which an emergency compels an inebriated person to drive."
Unlike the Idaho situation, the North Carolina legislature has not
attempted to curtail the courts' power to suspend sentences by a man-
datory sentence without regard to judicial discretion. Moreover, despite
some very early rulings against the practice," the North Carolina Su-
preme Court has long upheld the suspended sentence as valid."0 The
power to delay imposing sentence as well as the power to suspend execu-
tion of a sentence already pronounced are considered inherent powers
of the North Carolina judiciary.5 Also, the practice has been expressly
"Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243 (1970).
"See Note, Criminal Procedure-Capital Sentencing by a Standardless Jury, 50 N.C.L. REv.
118, 121 & n.22 (1971).
7See ALI-ABA JOINT COMM. ON CONTINUING LEGAL Educ., supra note 14, at 61-62.
4894 Idaho at . 486 P.2d at 251.
49E.g., State v. Bennett, 20 N.C. 170 (1838).
wState v. Crook, 115 N.C. 760, 20 S.E. 513 (1894). See also Coates, Punishment for Crime
in North Carolina, 17 N.C.L. REv. 205, 215 (1939).
"12 N.C.L. REV. 50 (1923). For an invaluable survey of the particulars and peculiarities of
North Carolina's suspended sentence powers, see Note, Criminal Law-Suspension of Sentence,
31 N.C.L. REV. 195 (1953).
[Vol. 51
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recognized by statute except where the crime is punishable by death or
life imprisonment." Ordinarily, the defendant's express or implied con-
sent is required, but if he accepts the conditions of suspension, he waives
the right to appeal the issue of his guilt or innocence, although he can
appeal the reasonableness of the conditions.53 The reasoning here is that
suspending the imposition of sentence is in the defendant's own behalf,
and if the fails to object, he tacitly agrees to the conditions of the
suspension.54
One reasonable limitation recognized by North Carolina statute
and case law is that the terms of suspension can run no longer than five
years.5 The most common condition is suspension upon good behavior
or conduct conforming to the law.5 Although the statute sets out some
guidelines for conditions-such as avoiding disreputable persons, re-
porting to the probation officer, and supporting one's dependents-it
expressly permits "any other. ' 57 Furthermore, the North Carolina Su-
preme Court has ruled that the probation statute and its procedures are
not binding upon the court's inherent power but rather are concurrent
with the court's power.58
In practice, North Carolina's system is quite laudable. The judge
is given broad discretion in deciding whether to grant suspension and
in choosing the appropriate conditions. Exercised with prudence, the
judge has a valuable corrective device to give minor offenders an oppor-
tunity at rehabilitation and reformation. Arguably, the relative leniency
of a suspended sentence may give offenders the mistaken impression
that criminal sanctions are easily averted, thereby lessening any hopes
of rehabilitation. But this is precisely where the judge's discretion should
operate. As a professional sentencer who has dealt with many different
offenders, the judge is in the ideal position to weigh all of the factors of
this particular crime with its own circumstances and the possibility of
its recurrence. In effect, the suspended sentence can be an incentive
toward defendant's good behavior in the future. 9
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-197 (1965).
"State v. Griffin, 246 N.C. 680, 682, 100 S.E.2d 49, 51 (1957).
"State v. Miller, 225 N.C. 213, 215, 34 S.E.2d 143, 145 (1945).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-200 (Supp. 1971).
5Note, 31 N.C.L. REV., supra note 51, at 200.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-199 (1965).
"State v. Simmington, 235 N.C. 612, 614, 70 S.E.2d 842, 844 (1952).
"30 HARv. L. REv. 369, 371 (1917). The suspended sentence is especially useful where the
minimum penalty under the statute is disproportionate to the criminality involved.
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Perhaps the whole issue appears moot since most state legislatures
have either expressly given their courts the power by statute or impliedly
given it under a probation system."° On the contrary, if the power to
suspend sentence upon good behavior or to place the defendant on
pprobation depends upon the legislature, then the legislature can summa-
rily take it away. If the legislature is allowed to set automatic, manda-
tory sentences without regard to judicial discretion or extenuating cir-
cumstances, then the judge is reduced to the machine-like state of read-
ing out carbon copy sentences based not upon the merits of the particu-
lar case but upon a bare minimal finding of facts. The Idaho Supreme
Court surmised, "A judge is more than just a finder of fact or an
executioner of the inexorable rule of law. Ideally, he is also the keeper
of the conscience of the law."'
THOMAS JOSEPH FARRIS
'J. WAITE, supra note 14, at 95-105.
"194 Idaho at - 486 P.2d at 251.
[Vol. 51!
